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Abstract
This study explores the e¤ects of patent protection and R&D subsidies on economic
growth and income inequality using a Schumpeterian growth model with heterogeneity
in household asset holdings. We nd that although strengthening patent protection
and raising R&D subsidies have the same macroeconomic e¤ect of stimulating economic
growth, they have drastically di¤erent microeconomic implications on income inequal-
ity. Specically, strengthening patent protection increases income inequality whereas
raising R&D subsidies decreases (increases) it if the quality step size is su¢ ciently small
(large). An empirically realistic quality step size is smaller than the threshold implying
a negative e¤ect of R&D subsidies on income inequality. We also calibrate the model
to provide a quantitative analysis and nd that strengthening patent protection causes
a moderate increase in income inequality and a negligible increase in consumption in-
equality whereas raising R&D subsidies causes a signicant decrease in both income
inequality and consumption inequality.
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1 Introduction
In this study, we explore the e¤ects of patent protection and R&D subsidies on economic
growth and income inequality. We consider the Schumpeterian growth model and extend
it by allowing for heterogeneity in the asset holdings of households. As Piketty (2014)
argues, an unequal distribution of wealth is an important cause of income inequality. Within
this growth-theoretic framework, we nd that although strengthening patent protection and
raising R&D subsidies have the same macroeconomic e¤ect of stimulating economic growth,
they have drastically di¤erent microeconomic implications on income inequality. Therefore, it
is important to consider beyond aggregate e¤ects and investigate distributional implications
when evaluating the overall e¤ects of a policy instrument.
When a strengthening of patent protection or a raise in R&D subsidies leads to a higher
rate of economic growth, the real interest rate also rises leading to an increase in asset income,
which is the cause of inequality in the model. As a result, strengthening patent protection and
raising R&D subsidies both have a positive e¤ect on income inequality via this interest-rate
channel. Intuitively, the higher interest rate increases the income of asset-wealthy households
relative to asset-poor households. Furthermore, the two policy instruments carry an asset-
value e¤ect that a¤ects income inequality. By increasing monopolistic prots, strengthening
patent protection increases asset value and causes an additional positive e¤ect on income
inequality. In contrast, raising R&D subsidies suppresses income inequality by reducing asset
value through creative destruction1 and consequently causing a decrease in asset income. As
a result of the opposing interest-rate and asset-value e¤ects, raising R&D subsidies has
an overall ambiguous e¤ect on income inequality. Specically, if the quality step size is
smaller (larger) than a threshold, then raising R&D subsidies leads to a lower (higher)
degree of income inequality. An empirically realistic quality step size is smaller than the
threshold implying a negative e¤ect of R&D subsidies on income inequality. In contrast,
a strengthening of patent protection causes a positive e¤ect on income inequality. This
theoretical result is consistent with the empirical nding in Adams (2008) who uses an index
of patent rights constructed by Ginarte and Park (1997) and nds that strengthening patent
protection has a positive and statistically signicant e¤ect on income inequality.
We also explore the e¤ects of patent protection and R&D subsidies on consumption in-
equality. We nd that strengthening patent protection increases consumption inequality
whereas raising R&D subsidies continues to have an overall ambiguous e¤ect on consump-
tion inequality. Finally, we calibrate the model to investigate the quantitative e¤ects of
patent protection and R&D subsidies on growth and inequality. The policy experiments
that we consider are to increase separately the rate of R&D subsidies and the level of patent
protection such that the R&D share of GDP increases by one-tenth in each case. We nd
that the increase in patent protection causes a moderate increase in income inequality and a
negligible increase in consumption inequality whereas the increase in R&D subsidies causes
a quantitatively signicant decrease in both income inequality and consumption inequality.
These results are robust to a number of robustness checks.
This study relates to the literature on R&D and economic growth. The seminal studies
1This creative-destruction e¤ect on asset value is also present in the case of patent protection but is o¤set
by its monopolistic-prot e¤ect.
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in this literature are Romer (1990), Segerstrom et al. (1990), Grossman and Helpman (1991)
and Aghion and Howitt (1992). Subsequent studies in this literature apply variants of the
R&D-based growth model to explore the e¤ects of patent protection and R&D subsidies
on innovation and economic growth; see for example Peretto (1998), Li (2001), Lin (2002,
2015), Furukawa (2007), Futagami and Iwaisako (2007), Horii and Iwaisako (2007), Iwaisako
and Futagami (2013), Zeng and Zhang (2007), Zeng et al. (2014), Chu (2009), Impullitti
(2010) and Acemoglu and Akcigit (2012). These studies focus on a representative-household
framework and do not consider the distributional implications of patent protection and R&D
subsidies. The current study lls this gap in the literature by exploring the e¤ects of patent
protection and R&D subsidies on inequality (in addition to growth) in a Schumpeterian
model with heterogeneous households.
A small number of studies in the literature also consider heterogeneous households in
the R&D-based growth model. Representative studies include Chou and Talmain (1996), Li
(1998), Zweimuller (2000), Foellmi and Zweimuller (2006) and Jones and Kim (2014). These
studies focus on how inequality a¤ects economic growth. In contrast, the current study
explores the e¤ects of policy instruments on income and consumption inequality. Chu (2010)
also explores the e¤ects of patent policy on income and consumption inequality; however, he
does not consider R&D subsidies. Therefore, this study generalizes the analysis in Chu (2010)
by providing a comparative analysis of two popular policy instruments, which appear to have
similar aggregate e¤ects but drastically di¤erent distributional implications. Furthermore,
we modify the R&D specication in Chu (2010) to a lab-equipment innovation process under
which R&D uses nal goods (instead of labor) as input. In this case, strengthening patent
protection causes the positive asset-value e¤ect in addition to the positive interest-rate e¤ect
on income inequality.2
The rest of this study is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model. Section 3
explores the e¤ects of patent protection and R&D subsidies. The nal section concludes.
2 A Schumpeterian growth model with heterogeneous
households
In this section, we extend the Schumpeterian quality-ladder model in Grossman and Helpman
(1991), which is a workhorse model in the literature, to allow for heterogeneous households
with di¤erent asset holdings. Furthermore, we consider two policy instruments, patent pro-
tection and R&D subsidies, in order to perform a comparative policy analysis. Finally, we
also modify the R&D specication by assuming a lab-equipment innovation process as in
Rivera-Batiz and Romer (1991).
2If R&D uses labor as input instead, then the positive asset-value e¤ect of patent protection would be
absent because the monopolistic-prot e¤ect is exactly o¤set by the creative-destruction e¤ect, but the
negative asset-value e¤ect of R&D subsidies would remain.
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2.1 Households
There is a unit continuum of households with identical preferences but di¤erent levels of
asset holdings. Households are indexed by h 2 [0; 1]. Each household h has the following
utility function:
u(h) =
Z 1
0
e t ln ct(h)dt. (1)
The parameter  > 0 is the subjective discount rate. Each household h supplies one unit
of labor to earn wage income and makes consumption-saving decision to maximize utility
subject to the following asset-accumulation equation:
_at(h) = rtat(h) + (1   t)wt   ct(h). (2)
at(h) is the real value of nancial assets owned by household h. rt is the real interest rate.
wt is the real wage rate. ct(h) is consumption by household h.  t 2 (0; 1) is the rate of a
wage income tax collected by the government.3 From standard dynamic optimization, the
Euler equation is given by
_ct(h)
ct(h)
= rt   , (3)
which shows that the growth rate of consumption is the same across households such that
_ct(h)=ct(h) = _ct=ct for all h 2 [0; 1], where ct 
R 1
0
ct(h)dh is aggregate consumption.
2.2 Final goods
Competitive rms produce nal good yt using the following Cobb-Douglas aggregator over
a unit continuum of di¤erentiated intermediate goods:
yt = exp
Z 1
0
lnxt(i)di

, (4)
where xt(i) denotes intermediate good i 2 [0; 1]. The conditional demand function for xt(i)
is given by
xt(i) =
yt
pt(i)
, (5)
where pt(i) is the price of xt(i).
3Here we consider a wage income tax for two reasons. First, it is non-distortionary and does not a¤ect
aggregate equilibrium allocations. Second, if we nance R&D subsidies by a tax on asset income which is
the source of inequality in the model, then raising R&D subsidies would cause an additional negative e¤ect
on inequality, which biases in favor of our nding of a negative e¤ect of R&D subsidies on inequality.
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2.3 Intermediate goods
There is a unit continuum of industries, which are also indexed by i 2 [0; 1], producing
di¤erentiated intermediate goods. In each industry i, there is a monopolistic industry leader,
who holds a patent on the latest technology and dominates the market until the arrival of
the next innovation.4 The production function of the leader in industry i is
xt(i) = z
nt(i)lt(i), (6)
where the parameter z > 1 is the step size of each quality improvement, nt(i) is the number of
quality improvements that have occurred in industry i as of time t, and lt(i) is the amount of
labor employed in industry i. Given the productivity level znt(i), the marginal cost function
of the leader in industry i is wt=znt(i). From Bertrand competition, the prot-maximizing
price is a constant markup over the marginal cost such that
pt(i) = 
wt
znt(i)
, (7)
where the markup   z is a policy parameter determined by the level of patent protection
in the economy.5 Given (7), the amount of monopolistic prot in industry i is
t(i) =
  1

pt(i)xt(i) =
  1

yt, (8)
and the wage payment in industry i is
wtlt(i) =
1

pt(i)xt(i) =
1

yt, (9)
where the second equality of (8) and (9) follows from (5).
2.4 R&D
Equation (8) shows that t(i) = t for all intermediate goods i 2 [0; 1]. Therefore, the value
of inventions is also the same across industries such that vt(i) = vt for all i 2 [0; 1].6 The
no-arbitrage condition that determines vt is
rt =
t + _vt   tvt
vt
, (10)
which states that the rate of return on vt must equal the interest rate. The rate of return on
vt is the sum of monopolistic prot t, capital gain _vt and expected capital loss tvt, where
t is the rate of creative destruction.
4See Cozzi (2007) for a discussion of this Arrow replacement e¤ect.
5The presence of monopolistic prot attracts potential imitation; therefore, stronger patent protection
allows monopolistic producers to charge a higher markup without losing their markets to potential imitators.
This formulation of patent breadth captures Gilbert and Shapiros (1990) seminal insight on "breadth as the
ability of the patentee to raise price".
6We follow the standard approach in the literature to focus on the symmetric equilibrium. See Cozzi et
al. (2007) for a theoretical justication for the symmetric equilibrium to be the unique rational-expectation
equilibrium in the Schumpeterian model.
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Competitive entrepreneurs devote Rt units of nal goods to R&D. The free-entry condi-
tion of R&D is
tvt = (1  s)Rt, (11)
where the policy parameter s 2 (0; 1) is the rate of R&D subsidies and tvt is the expected
return on R&D. We assume that t is an increasing function in R&D spending Rt given by
t =
'Rt
Zt
, (12)
where Zt is the level of technology in the economy and captures increasing R&D di¢ culty
due to an increasing-complexity e¤ect of technology.7 Combining (11) and (12) yields
vt =
1  s
'
Zt, (13)
which shows that invention value vt is proportional to technology level Zt and that the ratio
vt=Zt is decreasing in R&D subsidy s. Intuitively, for a given Zt, the free-entry condition
implies that an increase in subsidy s makes R&D cheaper and leads to a decrease in the price
of inventions. In equilibrium, this decrease in the value of inventions is caused by a higher
rate of creative destruction.
2.5 Government
The government decides on the level  of patent protection in the economy. Also, it collects
tax revenue to nance R&D subsidies and non-productive government expenditureGt subject
to the following balanced-budget condition:
 twt = sRt +Gt, (14)
where Gt = yt is assumed to be proportional to output. The parameter   Gt=yt  0 is
the ratio of government expenditure to output.
3 Solving the model
In this section, we proceed to solve the model as follows. Section 3.1 denes the equilibrium.
Section 3.2 shows that the aggregate economy always jumps to a unique balanced growth
path and explores the e¤ects of patent protection and R&D subsidies on the aggregate growth
rate of the economy. Section 3.3 shows that the wealth distribution is stationary, and hence,
it is exogenously determined by its initial condition. Sections 3.4 and 3.5 show that income
and consumption distributions are also stationary, but they are endogenously determined by
patent protection and R&D subsidies.
7See Venturini (2012) who provides empirical evidence for the presence of increasing R&D di¢ culty.
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3.1 Decentralized equilibrium
The equilibrium is a time path of allocations fct(h); at(h); yt; xt(i); lt(i); Rtg and a time path
of prices fwt; rt; pt(i); vtg. Also, at each instance of time, the following conditions hold:
 households h 2 [0; 1] maximize utility taking fwt; rtg as given;
 competitive rms produce nal good yt to maximize prot taking prices as given;
 each monopolistic rm i produces intermediate good xt(i) and chooses flt(i); pt(i)g to
maximize prot taking wt as given;
 competitive R&D entrepreneurs choose Rt to maximize expected prot taking fwt; vtg
as given;
 the market-clearing condition for labor holds such that R 1
0
lt(i)di = 1;
 the market-clearing condition for nal goods holds such that R 1
0
ct(h)dh+Rt+Gt = yt;
 the total value of household assets equals the value of all monopolistic rms such thatR 1
0
at(h)dh = vt.
3.2 Aggregate economy
From (9), we see that lt(i) = lt for all i 2 [0; 1]. Therefore, substituting (6) into (4) yields
yt = Ztlt = Zt, (15)
where the second equality uses lt = 1. Aggregate technology Zt is dened as
Zt  exp
Z 1
0
nt(i)di ln z

= exp
Z t
0
!d! ln z

, (16)
where the last equality uses the law of large numbers. Di¤erentiating the log of Zt with
respect to time yields the growth rate of technology given by
_Zt
Zt
= t ln z, (17)
where t = 'Rt=Zt from (12). The following proposition shows that the aggregate economy
jumps to a unique balanced growth path along which aggregate variables grow at the same
rate as technology.
Proposition 1 The aggregate economy jumps to a unique and saddle-point stable balanced
growth path along which variables fct; yt; wt; t; vtg grow at the same rate as technology Zt.
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Proof. See the Appendix.
Given Proposition 1, we impose balanced growth on (10) to derive
vt =
t
r   g +  =
t
+ 
, (18)
where g denotes the steady-state growth rate of technology. Substituting (18) into (13) yields
the steady-state arrival rate of innovation given by
 =
'
1  s
t
Zt
   = '
1  s
  1

  , (19)
where the second equality uses (8) and (15). Therefore, the steady-state growth rate of
technology is
g =  ln z =

'
1  s
  1

  

ln z. (20)
The following proposition shows that a strengthening of patent protection  and a raise in
R&D subsidy s both lead to an increase in R&D and the technology growth rate g. These
aggregate e¤ects of patent protection and R&D subsidies are quite common in the literature;
see for example Peretto (1998), Li (2001) and Chu (2011).
Proposition 2 The steady-state equilibrium growth rate of technology is increasing in the
level  of patent protection and the rate s of R&D subsidies.
Proof. Equation (20) shows that g is increasing in  and s.
3.3 Wealth distribution
At time 0, the share of assets owned by household h is exogenously given by a;0(h) 
a0(h)=a0, which has a general distribution function fa with a mean of one and a standard
deviation of a > 0. From (2), the aggregate value of nancial assets evolves according to
_at = rtat + (1   t)wt   ct, (21)
where at 
R 1
0
at(h)dh is the total value of nancial assets owned by all households. Com-
bining (2) and (21) yields the law of motion for a;t(h)  at(h)=at given by
_a;t(h)
a;t(h)
=
_at(h)
at(h)
  _at
at
=
ct   (1   t)wt
at
  ct(h)  (1   t)wt
at(h)
, (22)
which can be re-expressed as
_a;t(h) =
ct   (1   t)wt
at
a;t(h)  c;t(h)ct   (1   t)wt
at
, (23)
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where consumption share c;t(h)  ct(h)=ct is a stationary variable. From (3), _ct(h)=ct(h) =
_ct=ct, which in turn implies that _c;t(h)=c;t(h) = 0 and that c;t(h) = c;0(h) for all t > 0.
Then, recall that the aggregate economy is always on the balanced growth path along which
ct=at and wt=at are stationary. We will also show that the steady-state equilibrium tax rate
 is stationary. Therefore, (23) is a one-dimensional di¤erential equation, which describes
the potential evolution of a;t(h) given an initial a;0(h). In the appendix, we show that
the coe¢ cient on a;t(h) in (23) is positive. Together with the fact that a;t(h) is a state
variable, the only solution of (23) consistent with long-run stability is _a;t(h) = 0 for all t,
which is achieved by consumption share c;0(h) jumping to its steady-state value as shown
in the appendix.
Proposition 3 For every household h, its asset share is constant over time and exogenously
determined at time 0 such that a;t(h) = a;0(h) for all t.
Proof. See the Appendix.
3.4 Income distribution
Before-tax income earned by household h is
It(h)  rtat(h) + wt. (24)
Total before-tax income earned by all households is
It = rtat + wt. (25)
Combining these two equations yields the share of income earned by household h given by
I;t(h)  It(h)
It
=
rtata;0(h) + wt
rtat + wt
. (26)
From (3), we have rt = + g. From (13), we have vt = (1  s)Zt=', and we also know that
at = vt. From (9) and (15), we have wt = Zt=. Substituting these conditions into (26)
yields
I;t(h) =
(+ g)(1  s)a;0(h) + '
(+ g)(1  s)+ ' (27)
for all t. Equation (27) implies that the stationary distribution function fI of income share
has a mean of one and a standard deviation of
I =
sZ 1
0
[I(h)  1]2 dh = (+ g)(1  s)
(+ g)(1  s)+ 'a. (28)
Here we measure income inequality by the standard deviation I of income share, which is
equivalent to the coe¢ cient of variation of income. Substituting the steady-state equilibrium
growth rate g(; s) from (20) into (28) yields
I =
(1  ln z)(1  s) +  1

' ln z
(1  ln z)(1  s) +  1

' ln z + '=
a. (29)
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Proposition 4 The degree of income inequality is always increasing in the level  of patent
protection but decreasing (increasing) in the rate s of R&D subsidies if ln z < 1 (ln z > 1).
Proof. Equation (29) shows that I is increasing in  but decreasing (increasing) in s if
1  ln z > 0 (1  ln z < 0).
Recall that the steady-state equilibrium growth rate g(; s) is increasing in both  and
s. Equation (28) shows that an increase in g leads to an increase in income inequality I
by increasing the real interest rate and asset income, which is the cause of inequality in the
model. This is the symmetric interest-rate e¤ect of patent protection  and R&D subsidy s
on income inequality I . However, these two policy instruments have an additional e¤ect on
income inequality captured by the term (1 s) in (28), and this e¤ect is asymmetric between
 and s. To understand this asymmetric e¤ect, one can consider the ratio vt=wt = (1 s)='
derived from (9), (13) and (15). Interestingly, vt=wt is decreasing in R&D subsidy s but
increasing in patent protection . Intuitively, an increase in patent protection reduces the
share of wage income as (9) shows and raises the share of prot income as (8) shows, thereby
increasing asset income relative to wage income. In contrast, an increase in R&D subsidies
reduces asset income by decreasing the value of inventions as (13) shows. Therefore, while
strengthening patent protection causes only positive e¤ects on income inequality, raising
R&D subsidies carries both a positive e¤ect and a negative e¤ect on income inequality. The
positive e¤ect via the interest-rate channel is stronger when the quality step size is larger
because @g=@s is increasing in the quality step size z as (20) shows. Equation (29) shows
that if ln z is larger (smaller) than one, then a raise in R&D subsidies would have a positive
(negative) e¤ect on income inequality. The empirical value of z is often considered to be less
than 1.20;8 see for example Acemoglu and Akcigit (2012). Therefore, under an empirically
realistic quality step size, raising R&D subsidies has a negative e¤ect on income inequality.
3.5 Consumption distribution
From (2), consumption by household h is
ct(h) =

rt   _at(h)
at(h)

at(h) + (1  )wt = at(h) + (1  )wt, (30)
where the second equality uses (3) and the balanced-growth condition _at(h)=at(h) = _ct(h)=ct(h).
Aggregate consumption is
ct = at + (1  )wt. (31)
Combining (30) and (31) yields the share of consumption by household h given by
c;t(h)  ct(h)
ct
=
at(h) + (1  )wt
at + (1  )wt . (32)
8It is useful to note that ln(1:2)  0:182 < 1.
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Following the same derivations as in the previous subsection, we obtain
c;t(h) =
(1  s)a;0(h) + (1  )'
(1  s)+ (1  )' (33)
for all t. Equation (33) implies that the stationary distribution function of consumption
share has a mean of one and a standard deviation of
c =
sZ 1
0
[c(h)  1]2 dh = (1  s)
(1  s)+ (1  )'a, (34)
where the steady-state equilibrium tax rate  can be derived as follows by substituting (9),
(12), (15) and (19) into (14):
 = 
sR +G
y
= 

s
'
+ 

= s

1
1  s
  1

  
'

+ . (35)
Substituting (35) into (34) yields
c =
(1  s)
(  ')+ '(1  s)=(1  s)a. (36)
As before, we measure consumption inequality by the standard deviation of consumption
share, which is equivalent to the coe¢ cient of variation of consumption. Equation (34) shows
that consumption inequality c is independent of the interest rate because a higher interest
rate leads to a higher saving rate such that consumption ct(h) is always a constant fraction 
of asset at(h) due to the log utility function in (1). Therefore, unlike income inequality, the
interest-rate e¤ect of patents and R&D subsidies is absent under consumption inequality.
Consequently, for a given tax rate  , we are left with the asymmetric asset-value e¤ect of
patents and R&D subsidies captured by the term (1   s) in vt=wt = (1   s)=' and in
(34). As in the case of income inequality, a strengthening of patent protection has a positive
asset-value e¤ect on consumption inequality by raising asset income whereas an increase in
R&D subsidies causes a negative asset-value e¤ect. However, the tax rate  is also a function
of  and s. When either  or s increases, R&D spending increases, which in turn leads to
a higher tax rate  as (35) shows and worsens consumption inequality c because the tax
is levied on wage income wt rather than asset income that is the source of inequality in the
model. Therefore, strengthening patent protection increases consumption inequality due to
the positive asset-income and tax-rate e¤ects whereas raising R&D subsidies has an overall
ambiguous e¤ect on consumption inequality due to the negative asset-income e¤ect and the
positive tax-rate e¤ect.
Proposition 5 The degree of consumption inequality is increasing in the level  of patent
protection but can be decreasing or increasing in the rate s of R&D subsidies.
Proof. Equation (34) shows that c is increasing in  but can be decreasing or increasing
in s.
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4 Quantitative analysis
In this section, we calibrate the model to data in the US in order to provide a quantitative
analysis on the e¤ects of patent protection and R&D subsidies. The model features the
following aggregate parameters: f; s; ; z; '; g. We follow Acemoglu and Akcigit (2012) to
set the discount rate  to a conventional value of 0.05. We follow Impullitti (2010) to set the
R&D subsidy rate s in the US to 0.188. As for the patent protection level , we calibrate its
value by setting the time between arrivals of innovation to 1= = 3 years as in Acemoglu and
Akcigit (2012). As for the quality step size z, we calibrate its value by setting the long-run
growth rate g to 2%. We calibrate the value of R&D productivity ' by setting the R&D
share of GDP to R=y = 0:028. Finally, the ratio  of government spending to GDP is set to
0.2 as in Belo et al. (2013). These empirical moments are representative of the US economy.
Table 1 summarizes the calibrated parameter values.
Table 1: Calibrated parameter values
 s  z ' 
0.050 0.188 1.027 1.062 11.905 0.200
The policy experiments that we consider are to increase separately the R&D subsidy rate
s and the patent protection level  such that the R&D share of GDP R=y increases by one-
tenth from 0.028 to 0.031 in each case. Table 2 reports the resulting implications of each of
these policy changes on economic growth g, income inequality I and consumption inequality
c. Table 2a shows that in order to increase the R&D share of GDP R=y by one-tenth, patent
protection level  needs to increase from 1.027 to 1.029, in which case the growth rate g
increases from 2.0% to 2.2%. This increase in the growth rate leads to a corresponding
increase in the interest rate, which in turn drives up income inequality I . In this case,
the coe¢ cient of variation of income increases by 3.08%.9 As for consumption inequality
c, the coe¢ cient of variation of consumption increases negligibly by 0.36% because the
positive interest-rate e¤ect is absent. Although the positive asset-value e¤ect remains and
the positive tax-rate e¤ect appears, they are relatively minor in magnitude in the case of
patent protection.
Table 2b shows that in order to increase the R&D share of GDP R=y by one-tenth, the
R&D subsidy rate s needs to increase from 0.188 to 0.253. The increase in the growth rate
g is the same as above and gives rise to a positive interest-rate e¤ect on income inequality.
However, the magnitude of the increase in s is large, which in turn gives rise to a strong
negative asset-value e¤ect on income inequality I . In this case, the coe¢ cient of variation
of income decreases signicantly by 5.35%. As for consumption inequality c, the coe¢ cient
of variation of consumption decreases even more signicantly by 7.67% because the positive
interest-rate e¤ect is now absent. Although the positive tax-rate e¤ect appears, its magnitude
is relatively minor because R&D spending is a small share of GDP, and hence, the negative
asset-value e¤ect remains the dominant force.
9Here the change in income inequality I is reported as percent change (i.e., I  newI =oldI   1).
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Table 2a: E¤ects of patent protection
 R=y g I c
1.029 0.031 2.20% 3.08% 0.36%
Table 2b: E¤ects of R&D subsidies
s R=y g I c
0.253 0.031 2.20% -5.35% -7.67%
4.1 Robustness check: technology growth rate
Starting from this section, we consider a number of robustness checks on our numerical
analysis. In the previous section, we calibrate the value of the quality step size z by targeting
the long-run growth rate of output per capita in the US. It is equally reasonable to calibrate
the value of z by targeting the long-run growth rate of technology instead. In this case,
we re-calibrate the parameter values by setting g = 1%. Table 3 reports the re-calibrated
parameter values and shows that the calibrated value of z decreases from 1.062 to 1.030
(because a lower g =  ln z implies a lower z) whereas other parameter values remain largely
the same. Under the new parameter values, the long-run growth rate g increases by the
same proportion of one-tenth from 1.0% to 1.1%. Table 4 shows that the pattern of changes
in inequality is the same as before except that the increase in income inequality becomes
smaller at 1.90% whereas the decrease in consumption inequality becomes larger at 6.44%.
Table 3: Calibrated parameter values
 s  z ' 
0.050 0.188 1.027 1.030 11.905 0.200
Table 4a: E¤ects of patent protection
 R=y g I c
1.029 0.031 1.10% 1.90% 0.36%
Table 4b: E¤ects of R&D subsidies
s R=y g I c
0.253 0.031 1.10% -6.44% -7.67%
4.2 Robustness check: innovation arrival rate
So far we have considered a value of 1/3 for the innovation arrival rate , which however is
imprecisely estimated in the literature. Here we consider an alternative value of 0.1, which
implies a time between innovation arrivals of 10 years, while keeping a technology growth
rate of g = 1% as in the previous section. Table 5 reports the re-calibrated parameter
values and shows that the parameter that changes the most is R&D productivity ' that
decreases from 11.905 to 3.571 because the innovation arrival rate (') is an increasing
function of '. The value of z increases quite signicantly as well because a lower innovation
arrival rate  requires a larger quality step size z to maintain the same technology growth
rate g =  ln z. In this case, Table 6 shows that the increases in income and consumption
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inequality under patent protection are almost the same as before. Although the decreases
in income and consumption inequality under R&D subsidies become smaller at 4.63% and
5.91% respectively, they remain quantitatively signicant and larger in magnitude than the
changes in inequality under patent protection.
Table 5: Calibrated parameter values
 s  z ' 
0.050 0.188 1.035 1.105 3.571 0.200
Table 6a: E¤ects of patent protection
 R=y g I c
1.038 0.031 1.10% 1.88% 0.36%
Table 6b: E¤ects of R&D subsidies
s R=y g I c
0.239 0.031 1.10% -4.63% -5.91%
4.3 Robustness check: R&D share of GDP
Finally, we examine data on R&D share of GDP. As Comin (2004) argues, data on R&D
expenditures reported by rms may not capture all the resources devoted to innovation-
related activities. Here we consider a rough exercise by doubling the R&D share of GDP
from 0.028 to 0.056. Table 7 reports the re-calibrated parameter values and shows that the
markup ratio  increases from 1.035 to 1.073 becauseR=y is increasing in . The re-calibrated
value of R&D productivity ' decreases also signicantly because a lower R&D productivity is
required (given a higher R&D spending R=y) in order to keep the innovation arrival rate  at
0.10 as in the previous section. Table 8 shows that the increases in income and consumption
inequality under patent protection become larger at 2.10% and 0.76% respectively whereas
the decreases in income and consumption inequality under R&D subsidies become slightly
smaller at 4.56% and 5.54% respectively. However, the qualitative pattern remains that
income and consumption inequality increases under patent protection but decreases under
R&D subsidies and that the magnitude of the changes under R&D subsidies is larger than
under patent protection.
Table 7: Calibrated parameter values
 s  z ' 
0.050 0.188 1.073 1.105 1.786 0.200
Table 8a: E¤ects of patent protection
 R=y g I c
1.078 0.062 1.10% 2.10% 0.76%
Table 8b: E¤ects of R&D subsidies
s R=y g I c
0.239 0.062 1.10% -4.56% -5.54%
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5 Conclusion
In this study, we have explored the e¤ects of innovation policies, such as patent protection and
R&D subsidies, on economic growth and also income inequality, which is often neglected by
studies in the literature. We have shown that policy instruments may have similar aggregate
e¤ects on economic growth but very di¤erent distributional e¤ects on income inequality. We
have obtained this result in a Schumpeterian model with heterogeneity in household asset
holdings. Our model focuses on asset income inequality instead of wage income inequality for
two reasons. First, wage inequality in the form of skill premium has received much attention
in the literature, but only a relatively small number of studies have considered asset income
inequality in the Schumpeterian growth model. Second, empirical studies, such as Atkinson
(2000, 2003) and Piketty (2014), have shown that inequality in asset income is playing an
increasingly important role.10 Finally, although our model does not feature tangible assets
such as physical capital, intangible assets are an important part of the modern economy.11
References
[1] Acemoglu, D., and Akcigit, U., 2012. Intellectual property rights policy, competition
and innovation. Journal of the European Economic Association, 10, 1-42.
[2] Adams, S., 2008. Globalization and income inequality: Implications for intellectual
property rights. Journal of Policy Modeling, 30, 725735.
[3] Aghion, P., and Howitt, P., 1992. A model of growth through creative destruction.
Econometrica, 60, 323-351.
[4] Atkinson, A., 2000. The changing distribution of income: Evidence and explanations.
German Economic Review, 1, 3-18.
[5] Atkinson, A., 2003. Income inequality in OECD countries: Data and explanations.
CESifo Economic Studies 49, 479-513.
[6] Belo, F., Gala, V., and Li, J., 2013. Government spending, political cycles, and the
cross section of stock returns. Journal of Financial Economics, 107, 305-324.
[7] Chou, C.-F., and Talmain, G., 1996. Redistribution and growth: Pareto improvements.
Journal of Economic Growth, 1, 505-523.
[8] Chu, A., 2009. E¤ects of blocking patents on R&D: A quantitative DGE analysis. Jour-
nal of Economic Growth, 14, 55-78.
[9] Chu, A., 2010. E¤ects of patent policy on income and consumption inequality in an
R&D-based growth model. Southern Economic Journal, 77, 336-350.
10Reed and Cancian (2001) show that asset income causes about one-fourth of the increase in income
inequality in the 1990s compared to one-tenth of the rise in income inequality in the 1970s.
11Nakamura (2003) documents that the market value of intangible assets in the US is about half the value
of GDP.
15
[10] Chu, A., 2011. The welfare cost of one-size-ts-all patent protection. Journal of Eco-
nomic Dynamics and Control, 35, 876-890.
[11] Comin, D., 2004. R&D: A small contribution to productivity growth. Journal of Eco-
nomic Growth, 9, 391-421.
[12] Cozzi, G., 2007. The Arrow e¤ect under competitive R&D. The B.E. Journal of Macro-
economics (Contributions), 7, Article 2.
[13] Cozzi, G., Giordani, P., and Zamparelli, L., 2007. The refoundation of the symmetric
equilibrium in Schumpeterian growth models. Journal of Economic Theory, 136, 788-
797.
[14] Foellmi, R., and Zweimuller, J., 2006. Income distribution and demand-induced inno-
vations. Review of Economic Studies, 73, 941-960.
[15] Furukawa, Y., 2007. The protection of intellectual property rights and endogenous
growth: Is stronger always better?. Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, 31,
3644-3670.
[16] Futagami, K., and Iwaisako, T., 2007. Dynamic analysis of patent policy in an endoge-
nous growth model. Journal of Economic Theory, 132, 306-334.
[17] Gilbert, R., and Shapiro, C., 1990. Optimal patent length and breadth. RAND Journal
of Economics, 21, 106-112.
[18] Ginarte, J., and Park, W., 1997. Determinants of patent rights: A cross-national study.
Research Policy, 26, 283-301.
[19] Grossman, G., and Helpman, E., 1991. Quality ladders in the theory of growth. Review
of Economic Studies, 58, 43-61.
[20] Horii, R., and Iwaisako, T., 2007. Economic growth with imperfect protection of intel-
lectual property rights. Journal of Economics, 90, 45-85.
[21] Impullitti, G., 2010. International competition and U.S. R&D subsidies: A quantitative
welfare analysis. International Economic Review, 51, 1127-1158.
[22] Iwaisako, T., and Futagami, K., 2013. Patent protection, capital accumulation, and
economic growth. Economic Theory, 52, 631-668.
[23] Jones, C., and Kim, J., 2014. A Schumpeterian model of top income inequality. NBER
Working Paper No. 20637.
[24] Li, C.-W., 1998. Inequality and growth: a Schumpeterian perspective. Unpublished
paper, University of Glasgow.
[25] Li, C.-W., 2001. On the policy implications of endogenous technological progress. Eco-
nomic Journal, 111, C164-C179.
16
[26] Lin, H., 2002. Shall the Northern optimal R&D subsidy rate inversely respond to South-
ern intellectual property protection?. Southern Economic Journal, 69, 381-397.
[27] Lin, H., 2015. Creative destruction and optimal patent life in a variety-expansion growth
model. Southern Economic Journal, 81, 803-828.
[28] Nakamura, L., 2003. A trillion dollars a year in intangible investment and the new
economy. In Intangible Assets: Values, Measures, and Risks, edited by J. Hand and B.
Lev. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 19-47.
[29] Peretto, P., 1998. Technological change and population growth. Journal of Economic
Growth, 3, 283-311.
[30] Piketty, T., 2014. Capital in the Twenty-First Century. Harvard University Press.
[31] Reed, D., and Cancian, M., 2001. Sources of inequality: Measuring the contributions
of income sources to rising family income inequality. Review of Income and Wealth, 47,
321-33.
[32] Rivera-Batiz, L., and Romer, P., 1991. Economic integration and endogenous growth.
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 106, 531-555.
[33] Romer, P., 1990. Endogenous technological change. Journal of Political Economy, 98,
S71-S102.
[34] Segerstrom, P., Anant, T., and Dinopoulos, E., 1990. A Schumpeterian model of the
product life cycle. American Economic Review, 80, 1077-91.
[35] Venturini, F., 2012. Looking into the black box of Schumpeterian growth theories: An
empirical assessment of R&D races. European Economic Review, 56, 1530-1545.
[36] Zeng, J., and Zhang, J., 2007. Subsidies in an R&D growth model with elastic labor.
Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, 31, 861-886.
[37] Zeng, J., Zhang, J., and Fung, M., 2014. Patents and price regulation in an R&D growth
model. Macroeconomic Dynamics, 18, 1-22.
[38] Zweimuller, J., 2000. Schumpeterian entrepreneurs meet Engels law: The impact of
inequality on innovation-driven growth. Journal of Economic Growth, 5, 185-206.
17
Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1. From (8), (9), (13) and (15), we have
_vt
vt
=
_Zt
Zt
=
_yt
yt
=
_wt
wt
=
_t
t
, (A1)
which shows that fyt; wt; t; vtg grow at the same rate as technology Zt. We also know that
the value of inventions equals the value of assets such that vt = at; therefore, at also grows at
the same rate as technology Zt. Recall from (17) that the growth rate of Zt is _Zt=Zt = t ln z.
In the rest of this proof, we will show that t jumps to a unique and stable steady state, so
that _Zt=Zt also jumps to its steady-state value. From (12), we have
t =
'Rt
Zt
= '

1     ct
Zt

, (A2)
where the second equality uses yt = ct+Rt+Gt, yt = Zt andGt = yt. If we dene t  ct=Zt,
then t = '(1      t), which shows that the dynamics of t is solely determined by the
dynamics of t. Taking the log of t and di¤erentiating it with respect to time yield
_t
t
=
_ct
ct
 
_Zt
Zt
=
_ct
ct
  _vt
vt
, (A3)
where the second equality uses (A1). Recall from (3) that _ct(h)=ct(h) = _ct=ct. Then,
substituting (3) and (10) into (A3) yields
_t
t
=
t
vt
  t    = t
vt
  '(1     t)  , (A4)
where the second equality uses (A2). Substituting (8), (13) and (15) into (A4) yields
_t
t
=
'
1  s
  1

  '(1     t)   = 't   , (A5)
where we dene a composite parameter   '(1  ) +   '
1 s
 1

, which is assumed to be
positive by imposing parameter restrictions.12 Equation (A5) shows that the dynamics of t
is characterized by instability, so that t must jump to its unique and saddle-point stable
steady state given by  = ='. At the steady state, ct and Zt grow at the same rate given
by g =  ln z = '(1     ) ln z = ['(1  )  ] ln z as in (20).
Proof of Proposition 3. Substituting (9), (13), (15) and at = vt into (23) yields
_a;t(h) = '
t   (1  )=
1  s a;t(h)  '
c;t(h)t   (1  )=
1  s , (A6)
12Otherwise, t and ct would be negative.
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which also uses t  ct=Zt. Recall from (3) that _ct(h)=ct(h) = _ct=ct, which in turn implies
_c;t(h) = 0 for all t. Substituting c;t(h) = c;0(h) and t = =' for all t into (A6) yields
_a;t(h) =
  '(1  )=
1  s a;t(h) 
c;0(h)  '(1  )=
1  s . (A7)
Therefore, the dynamic property of a;t(h) depends on the sign of [  '(1  )=]=(1  s).
To see that  > '(1  )=, one can use (35) to show that
 >
'(1  )

, s < 1. (A8)
Therefore, the coe¢ cient on a;t(h) in (A7) is positive, which in turn implies that _a;t(h) = 0
for all t is the only solution of (A7) consistent with long-run stability. Finally, imposing
_a;t(h) = 0 on (A7) yields the steady-state value of c;t(h) given by
c;0(h) =
'(1  )

+

1  '(1  )


a;0(h). (A9)
Equation (A9) shows that @c;0(h)=@a;0(h) > 0 given  > '(1  )=.
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